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A new approach for evaluation of risk priorities of failure modes
in FMEA
FIORENZO FRANCESCHINIy* and MAURIZIO GALETTOy
This paper presents a method for carrying out the calculus of the risk priority of
failures in Failure Mode and EŒ ect Analysis (FMEA). The novelty of the method
consists of new management of data provided by the design team, normally
given on qualitative scales, without necessitating an arbitrary and arti® cial
numerical conversion. The practical eŒ ects of these issues are shown in an
application example.
1. Preliminary considerations
Since its introduction as a support tool for designers, FMEA (Failure Mode and
EŒ ect Analysis) has been extensively used in a wide range of contexts (Stamatis 1995,
Hatty and Owens 1995, Bowles 1998). The great number of papers published in
various technological and service areas bear witness to this interest (Hatty and
Owens 1995, Wirth et al. 1996).
Designers’ interest in FMEA is due to its capacity to perceive two very important
aspects:
. the capability of stimulating the application of the continuous improvement
concept in design (Franceschini and Rossetto 1995b);
. the possibility of methodical documenting of the design evolution.
FMEA is a reliability tool, which requires identifying failure modes of a speci® c
product or system, their frequency and potential causes. It is normally applied by an
interfunctional work team, with the right know-how to analyse the whole product
life cycle.
As a result of its application, it allows `quantifying’ how `dangerous’ a failure
mode is, and also provides a rank of risk priorities of failure modes and a list of
corrective actions to remove them.
A typical form used for FMEA development is illustrated in table 1. It shows a
list of items that identify:
. the system or component part
. the potential failure mode
. the potential eŒ ect of failure
. the severity index (S)
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.. the potential cause of failure
. the frequency of occurrence index (O)
. the design veri® cation actions
. the detectability index (D)
. the Risk Priority Number (RPN).
The characteristic failure mode indexes are expressed on ordinal qualitative scales
(Fraser 1994, Franceschini and Rossetto 1997) identifying the various levels of
`dangerous’ situations. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the qualitative scales mostly used
for the severity, the detectability and the occurrence indexes (Stamatis 1995). It is
assumed that all index scales have the same number of scale levels.
For a generic design, after the identi® cation of failure modes, eŒ ects and causes
of a possible occurrence, the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is calculated. RPN is an
index that expresses the risk level priority associated with each failure mode.
In the traditional FMEA approach, the RPN index is determined by calculating
the product of the three indexes: severity, frequency and detection:
RPN ˆ S ¢ O ¢ D: …1†
In the RPN calculation, the assigned values on the three index qualitative scales
are interpreted as being numbers. `Information initially gathered on the qualitative
scales’ is therefore arbitrarily interpreted and utilized on a quantitative scale with
diŒ erent properties from the ® rst one.
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Level Criteria
No 1 No eŒ ect.
Very slight 2 Customer not annoyed. Very slight eŒ ect on product or system
performance.
Slight 3 Customer slightly annoyed. Slight eŒ ect on product or system
performance.
Minor 4 Customer experiences minor nuisance. Minor eŒ ect on product or
system performance.
Moderate 5 Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. Moderate eŒ ect on
product or system performance.
Signi® cant 6 Customer experiences discomfort. Product performance
degraded, but operable and safe. Partial failure, but operable.
Major 7 Customer dissatis® ed. Product performance severely aŒ ected but
functionable and safe. System impaired.
Extreme 8 Customer very dissatis® ed. Product inoperable but safe. System
inoperable.
Serious 9 Potential hazardous eŒ ect. Able to stop product without
mishapÐ time dependent failure. Compliance with government
regulation is in jeopardy.
Hazardous 10 Hazardous eŒ ect. Safety relatedÐ sudden failure. Non-
compliance with government regulation.
Table 2. Qualitative scale for the severity index (S) (Stamatis 1995).In other words, the original ordinal scale is transformed in a new cardinal scale
characterized by a metric and by the integer number composition properties.
The RPN is thus de® ned on a rather special scale, which, moreover, does not
completely cover the range [1,1000] of the integers because there are, for example,
some `holes’ corresponding to prime numbers contained in the range itself.
This arbitrary `promotion’ of the scale properties brings about a series of prob-
lems in the RPN interpretation. In more detail, the data numbering involves:
. the de® nition of the RPN on a formally wider scale than that of the three
component indexes, which generates a ® ctitious increase of its resolution;
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EŒ ect Level Criteria
Almost never 1 Failure unlikely. History shows no failure.
Remote 2 Rare number of failures likely.
Vert slight 3 Very few failures likely.
Slight 4 Few failures likely.
Low 5 Occasional number of failures likely.
Medium 6 Medium number of failures likely.
Moderately high 7 Moderately high number of failures likely.
High 8 High number of failures likely.
Very high 9 Very high number of failures likely.
Almost certain 10 Failure almost certain. History of failures exists from previous
or similar designs.
Table 3. Qualitative scale for the occurrence index (O) (Stamatis 1995).
EŒ ect Level Criteria
Almost certain 1 Proven detection methods available in concept stage.
Very high 2 Proven computer analysis available in early design stage.
High 3 Simulation and/or modelling in early stage.
Moderately high 4 Tests on early prototype system elements.
Medium 5 Tests on preproduction system components.
Low 6 Tests on similar system components.
Slight 7 Tests on product with prototypes with system components
installed.
Very slight 8 Proving durability tests on products with system components
installed.
Remote 9 Only unproven or unreliable technique(s) available.
Almost 10 No known techniques available.
imposible
Table 4. Qualitative scale for the detectability index (D) (Stamatis 1995).. the assumption that the scales of the three S, O and D indexes have the same
metric and that the same danger level corresponds to the same values on
diŒ erent index scales;
. the assumption that the three failure mode indexes are all equally important;
. the possibility of identifying, with the same RPN, situations characterized by
diŒ erent danger index levels. For example, the condition assigning to (S, O, D)
indexes the values (8, 1, 1) is considered at the same level as (2, 2, 2). Both
situations determine an RPN ˆ 8. But is this statement legitimate?
The numeric data interpretation brings about the simpli® cation of the RPN
calculation; however, it also increases the risk of moving its meaning away from
the logic of the design team that supplied the ® gures.
The numberingÐ acknowledging `metrological properties’ higher than actually
possessed by collected informationÐ can therefore cause a `distortion’ eŒ ect, which
can partially or completely distort the contents (Franceschini and Rossetto 1995a,
1998).
Other methods have been proposed for the RPN calculation in the literature
(Bowles and Pelaez 1995, Goossens and Cooke 1997). However, they do not
remove some of the complexities illustrated during the discussion. In particular,
these methods are quite complex to manage and require the de® nition of special
functions and/or a know-how that is not always available to designers. These issues
stimulated the idea of setting up an alternative method to the traditional one. This
method is able to solve some of the questions raised and, in particular, the need to
introduce non-existing properties to estimate the RPN index. It also allows the
design team to implement ¯ exible strategies to detect the most dangerous failure
modes.
The method also provides the possibility of considering the diŒ erence in import-
ance of the characteristic indexes, so avoiding a further work burden for designers.
At the end of the discussion, an example of the new approach together with a
comparison with the traditional procedure will be provided.
2. The method
The main aim of de® ning failure mode priorities is to draw the designer’s atten-
tion towards the most dangerous failure modes for the product. For this to be an
important eŒ ort improving the design quality, it must not alter the content of the
information supplied by the design team during the analysis.
The proposed method is able to deal with information expressed on an ordered
qualitative scale with no need to resort to an arti® cial numerical conversion of the
scale. It can be classi® ed within the class of ME-MCDM techniques (Multi
ExpertÐ Multiple Criteria Decision Making) (Yager 1993).
The use of qualitative scales raises a few issues for data processing. For example,
in using numeric scales, the diŒ erence operation between two scale elements is
de® ned, but this does not happen for qualitative scales, which have ordinal proper-
ties only.
The method is inspired by the work of Bellman and Zadeh, lately `enriched’ by
Yager, for the solution of multi-criteria decision-making problems (Bellman and
Zadeh 1970, 1975, 1976, Yager 1981, Yager and Filev 1994). In fact, FMEA can
be considered as a decision-making support tool for designers. The decision consists
2995 Evaluation of risk priorities of failure modesof de® ning the order to analyse (from a design point of view) the failure mode eŒ ects
of the considered product.
Characteristic indexes can be interpreted as evaluation criteria gj (with
j ˆ 1;...;n), while failure modes as the alternatives ai (with i ˆ 1;...;m) to be
selected.
The method considers each decision-making criterion (characteristic index) as a
`fuzzy’ subset over the set of alternatives to be selected.
The grade of membership of alternative ai in gj indicates the degree to which ai
satis® es the criterion speci® ed.
The model suggests a two-step procedure.
(i) Aggregation of evaluations expressed on each criterion for a given alternative
(ai)
RPC…ai† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…I…gi††;gj…ai†g; …2†
where
RPC…ai† is the Risk Priority Code for the failure mode ai.
I…gj† is the importance associated with each criterion gj.
Neg…I…gj†† is the negation of the importances assigned to each decision-
making criterion.
The negation of an s-point ordinal scale is calculated as follows (Yager 1981, 1993):
Neg…Li† ˆ Lz i‡1; …3†
where Li is the ith level of the scale.
(ii) Determination of the failure mode with the maximum risk priority code (a*)
RPC…a*† ˆ Max
ai6ˆA
fRPC…ai†g; …4†
where
A is the set of failure modes.
RPC…ai† is de® ned on a new 10-point ordinal scale as those values utilized for
expressing index evaluations.
If two or more failure modes have the same risk priority code we may obtain a
more detailed selection considering the indicator T…ai† ˆ DimA…ai†, where the
operator DimA…ai† gives the number of elements contained in the set A…ai†, and
A…ai† ˆ fgj…ai†jgj…ai† > RPC…a*†g. This term represents a second-step investigation
for establishing a measure of the dispersion of criteria, related to a speci® c failure
mode, around the RPC index. It gives an estimation of how many important criteria
with high evaluations, compared with the calculated RPC, are present in the evalua-
tion of each failure mode.
It is assumed that the importance associated with each evaluation criterion is
de® ned on a 10-point ordinal scale similar to those used for index scales. It is also
assumed that the same danger level corresponds to the same ordinal level on the
diŒ erent scales. Table 5 shows the correspondence map between the severity, occur-
rence and detectability indexes and their related importances. If the four scales do
not have the same number of levels the mappings can become more complex.
2996 F. Franceschini and M. GalettoFrom equation (2) we note that the Min operation selects the smallest of its
arguments. If all arguments are high they do not aŒ ect the min operation.
Consider a criterion that has little importance, it will get an importance rating Lk
that is low on the scale. When we take the negation of this score we get something
high. When we take the Max of the importance criteria with the evaluation gj…ai) we
still get a high score. Thus, we see that low-importance criteria have little eŒ ect on
the overall `score’.
It can be shown that the formulation suggested in equation (2) satis® es the
properties of Pareto optimality, independence to irrelevant alternatives, positive
association of individual scores with overall score and symmetry (Yager 1981, 1993).
An essential feature of this approach is that we have no need to use numeric
values and force undue precision on the design team experts.
We note that, in equation (2), we are implicitly assuming a logic to satisfy all
characteristics that are important. The term MaxfNeg…I…gj††;gjg indicates a value
for a given criterion to the statement `if the criterion is important, then it has a high
score’.
Equation (4) allows the selection of the failure mode with the maximum risk
priority code. The rationale of the procedure is to consider the most dangerous
failure modes to be those with the highest evaluations on the most important criteria.
When two or more failure modes have the same ranking we provide a more detailed
selection with the T…ai† index. T…ai† de® nes, for each failure mode, the cardinality of
the total number of `equivalent’ risk levels associated with all criteria.
The traditional FMEA is not able to manage situations in which characteristic
indexes have diŒ erent importances. Some authors (Raheja 1991, De Risi 1996) sug-
gest that an appropriate strategy is to analyse all failure modes that are above some
speci® ed threshold RPN or above some severity threshold. For instance, a design
team might set a policy where all failure modes whose severity is higher than 9 will be
analysed in addition to those failure modes whose RPN is above 500. This approach
recognizes the need to diŒ erentiate the relative importance of the severity, occurrence
and detection indexes, but proposes a rigid scheme in which the severity index is the
most important.
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Level S Index O Index D Index I…S;O;D†
L1 No Almost never Almost certain No
L2 Very slight Remote Very high Very low
L3 Slight Very slight High Low
L4 Minor Slight Moderate high Minor
L5 Moderate Low Medium Moderate
L6 Signi® cant Medium Low Signi® cant
L7 Major Moderately high Slight Major
L8 Extreme High Very slight High
L9 Serious Very high Remote Very high
L10 Hazardous Almost certain Almost impossible Absolute
Table 5. Correspondence map between severity, occurrence and detectability indexes and the
qualitative scale for the importance associated with each evaluation criterion.In some particular contexts it might be necessary to change the order of
priority among indexes or to change the logic of their analysis. The proposed
method overcomes these constraints. It allows a more ¯ exible structure for combin-
ing the index importances, and the possibility of de® ning diŒ erent technical logics of
analysis. If we change, in equation (2), the composition of the operators and the `tie-
ranking’ rule, the design team may build models able to express logics of synthesis
diŒ erent from that proposed. For example, we might de® ne RPC as
RPC…ai† ˆ MaxjfMin‰…I…gj†;gj…ai†Šg, which represents a new logic in which the
most dangerous failure mode is that with the highest evaluation on the most import-
ant criterion.
An application example may better explain the method.
3. An application example
Let us consider the example of a design of a cooling fan assembly (see table 1).
Let us analyse four diŒ erent situations.
(a) All characteristic indexes have the same max importance (L10). This con-
dition is very similar to the `traditional’ FMEA, where all the indexes have
the same importance.
I…S† ˆ L10; I…O† ˆ L10; I…D† ˆ L10:
Calling a1, a2, a3 and a4 the four failure modes, the aggregated RPC index
calculation is performed as indicated by equation (2).
According to equation (3), the negations of a 10-point ordinal scale are:
Neg…L1† ˆ L10; Neg…L6† ˆ L5;
Neg…L2† ˆ L9; Neg…L7† ˆ L4;
Neg…L3† ˆ L8; Neg…L8† ˆ L3;
Neg…L4† ˆ L7; Neg…L9† ˆ L2;
Neg…L5† ˆ L6; Neg…L10† ˆ L1:
Now it is possible to calculate the RPC for the four failure modes (see
column six of table 6):
RPC…a1† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a1†gŠ
ˆ MinfMax‰Neg…L10†;L5Š; Max‰Neg…L10†;L5Š;
Max‰Neg…L10†;L4Šg ˆ MinfMax‰L1;L5Š;Max‰L1;L5Š;
Max‰L1;L4Šg ˆ MinfL5;L5;L4g ˆ L4
RPC…a2† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a2†gŠ ˆ L2
RPC…a3† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a3†gŠ ˆ L2
RPC…a4† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a4†gŠ ˆ L3:
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.The maximum priority value is:
RPC…a*† ˆ Max
ai 2 A
‰RPC…a1†;RPC…a2†;RPC…a3†;RPC…a4†;Š
ˆ RPC…a1† ˆ L4
and therefore the most dangerous failure mode is a1.
(b) In some application contexts, it can be useful to de® ne a different level of
importance for the three S, O and D indexes. In this case we cannot use the
traditional RPN approach.
If I…S† ˆ L10;I…O† ˆ L8;I…D† ˆ L6:
The RPC for the four failure modes (see column seven of table 6) are:
RPC…a1† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…i…gj††;gj…a1†gŠ ˆ L5
RPC…a2† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…i…gj††;gj…a2†gŠ ˆ L3
RPC…a3† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…i…gj††;gj…a3†gŠ ˆ L3
RPC…a4† ˆ Min
j
‰MaxfNeg…i…gj††;gj…a4†gŠ ˆ L5:
The maximum priority value is:
RPC…a*† ˆ Max
ai2A
‰RPC…a1†;RPC…a2†;RPC…a3†;RPC…a4†Š
ˆ RPC…a1† ˆ RPC…a4† ˆ L5
In this case the most dangerous failure modes are a1 and a4.
With the aim of discriminating their relative ranking we calculate the
indexes T…a1†and T…a4†:
A…a1† ˆ fgj…a1†jgj…a1† > RPC…a*†g ˆ fgj…a1†jgj…a1† > L5g ˆ ©
) T…a1† ˆ DimA…a1† ˆ Dim© ˆ 0
A…a4† ˆ fgj…a4†jgj…a4† > RPC…a*†g ˆ fgj…a4†jgj…a4† > L5g
ˆ fg1…a4†;g2…a4†g ˆ fL6;L6g
) T…a4† ˆ DimA…a4† ˆ 2:
Since T…a4† > T…a1† then a4 is the most dangerous failure mode.
(c) If I(S) ˆ L10; I…O† ˆ L5; I…D† ˆ L1
The RPC for the four failure modes (see column eight of table 6) are:
RPC…a1† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a1†gŠ ˆ L5
RPC…a2† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a2†gŠ ˆ L5
RPC…a3† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a3†gŠ ˆ L6
RPC…a4† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a4†gŠ ˆ L6:
3000 F. Franceschini and M. GalettoThe maximum priority value is:
RPC…a*† ˆ Max
ai2A
‰RPC…a1†;RPC…a2†;RPC…a3†;RPC…a4†;Š
ˆ RPC…a3† ˆ RPC…a4† ˆ L6
and therefore the most dangerous failure modes are a3 and a4.
Since a3 and a4 have the same ranking, we calculate T…a3†and T…a4†:
T…a3† ˆ 1; T…a4† ˆ 0:
Being T…a3† > T…a4†, we conclude that a3 is more dangerous than a4.
(d) If I(S)ˆ L1; I…O† ˆ L5; I…D† ˆ L10.
The RPC for the four failure modes (see column nine of table 6) are:
RPC…a1† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a1†gŠ ˆ L4
RPC…a2† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a2†gŠ ˆ L5
RPC…a3† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a3†gŠ ˆ L3
RPC…a4† ˆ Min
j
‰fMaxfNeg…I…gj††;gj…a4†gŠ ˆ L3:
The maximum priority value is:
RPC…a*† ˆ Max
ai2A
‰RPC…a1†;RPC…a2†;RPC…a3†;RPC…a4†;Š
ˆ RPC…a2† ˆ L5:
The most dangerous failure mode is a2.
Table 6 contains a synthesis of the RPN and RPC indexes for the ex-
ample of table 1, using four sets of importances associated with each index.
Analysing the data contained in table 6 we can observe:
. lowering the importance attached to a particular index (for example, the
detectability index), decreases its in¯ uence on the selected failure mode;
. the RPC index allows analysis of application cases in which we have a diŒ erent
importance for the three input indexes. This cannot be done by using the RPN
index.
. if two or more failure modes have the same RPC, it is possible to perform a
more detailed selection with the help of the T…ai† index. In such a way we can
discriminate `tie’ situations in which the RPN gives the same result. Let us
consider, for example, the two conditions assigning respectively the values (6,
1, 1) and (2, 3, 1) to (S, O, D) indexes;
. the mapping of failure modes on the RPC scale gives their relative importance
only. The absolute value assumed is not important. So, for example, according
to table 5, the level L4 means that the corresponding failure mode has a
priority lower than L5 and higher than L3;
. it must be noted that the proposed method allows for a more ¯ exible structure
for combining the indexes and de® ning diŒ erent technical logics of analysis.
3001 Evaluation of risk priorities of failure modes4. Conclusions
This paper introduces and discusses the application of a new method to calculate
the risk priority level for the failure mode in FMEA. Data processing is performed
by working exclusively on the ordinal features of qualitative scales used to collect
information from designers. The method’s processing simplicity is comparable with
the RPN calculation.
The main novel elements of the proposed method are:
. it does not require any arbitrary and arti® cial scaling of collected information;
. it is able to deal with situations having diŒ erent importance levels for the three
failure mode component indexes;
. it is able to aggregate design team information, even if they are expressed on
ordinal qualitative scales;
. it is easy to computerize.
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